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Rescuing the Commerce Clause: Why the Federal
Government May Not Constitutionally Regulate the
Possession of Firearms
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government is a government of enumerated powers.1
These powers are expressly granted by the people through the
United States Constitution.2 It is clear, therefore, that the United
States government is one of limited powers, and can act pursuant
only to the authority that is granted to it by the Constitution.3
This grant of authority could be expressly made in the Constitu-
tion, or may be a necessary implication of an express grant.4
Among the powers not granted to the federal government and re-
served to the states is a general police power.'
"Congress has no general power to enact police regulations op-
erative within the territorial limits of a state[.]" It has been
stated that a police power extends to "the making [of] regulations
promotive of domestic order, morals, health, and safety."' This
police power includes the power to define crimes, which the fed-
eral government may not define for a state unless the Constitution
expressly permits federal regulation of the activity.' Despite the
federal government's lack of a general police power and the limita-
tions on its ability to enact criminal legislation within the states,
an increasing desire to find national solutions to a variety of is-
sues has prompted Congress to find justification for regulating
ever-broadening areas of activity within the enumerated powers.9
One enumerated power that has been frequently used by Congress
in enacting such regulations is the power granted to Congress un-
der the Commerce Clause. °




5. Id. at § 328.
6. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 328 (2003).
7. R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,470-71 (1877).
8. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 (2d ed. 2003).
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The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the
power "It]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."" Among the regu-
lations passed by Congress under its commerce power is the regu-
lation of firearms. Along with other offenses, these regulations
prohibit the possession of firearms by several classes of individu-
als, ranging from felons to juveniles. 12 Federal law also prohibits
the types of firearms that all individuals may possess, regardless
of the class of the individual.3 Additionally, federal law prohibits
the possession of a firearm in a school zone, as well as the theft of
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (x)(2) (2000). Section 922(g) states as follows:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (citation
omitted);
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed
to a mental institution;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable condi-
tions;
(8) who is subject to a court order that-
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and
at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging
in other conduct that could place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bod-
ily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury; or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence,to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). Section 922(x)(2) states as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any
person who is a juvenile to knowingly possess--(A) a handgun; or (B) ammunition that is
suitable for use only in a handgun." 18 U.S.C § 922(x)(2) (2000).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) and (v)(1). Section 922(o)(1) provides that "[e]xcept as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine
gun." 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (2000). Section 922(v)(1) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for a
person to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon." 18 U.S.C. §
922(v)(1) (2000).
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a firearm." Although each of these acts was passed pursuant to
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, these regula-
tions do not deal with commerce directly. Rather, the statutes are
aimed at regulating criminal activity that the states would typi-
cally regulate under their police power. If this is the case, the
regulations overstep the authority granted to Congress under the
Constitution, and are therefore unconstitutional. 5 In determining
whether any congressional act is constitutional, it must first be
decided "whether the enactment is made pursuant to one of the
powers granted the federal government under the Constitution...
."6 It must then be decided whether the law "violates some spe-
cific check on federal power such as those contained in the Bill of
Rights."" In deciding whether the regulation of firearms posses-
sion is constitutional, it must first be determined whether these
laws are a valid exercise of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause." Should the regulations be found valid, it
must then be decided whether there are any other sections of the
Constitution that prohibit the federal government from regulating
the possession of firearms. 9
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The History of the Commerce Clause
When analyzing whether the power to regulate firearms is
granted to the Congress as part of its commerce power, it is impor-
tant to look to the history of the Commerce Clause in order to de-
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) and (u) (2000). Section 922(q)(2)(A) states that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that oth-
erwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). Section
922(u) provides that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to steal or unlawfully take or carry away from the
person or the premises of a person who is licensed to engage in the business of im-
porting, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, any firearm in the licensee's business
inventory that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (2000).
15. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAx, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 3.1 (3d ed. 1999). Because the federal government is one of
enumerated powers, "[ilt can only act to effectuate the powers specifically granted to it,
rather than acting for the general welfare of the populace." Id.
16. Id. at § 3.1.
17. Id. "Even if the federal government is acting pursuant to one of its enumerated




termine the meaning and scope of this federal authority. During
and following the Revolutionary War, the states were loosely
bound together by the Articles of Confederation.2 ° Under this sys-
tem, the individual states were free to, and in fact did, enact tar-
iffs and other regulations that were restrictive of trade, both be-
tween themselves and between a state and a foreign country.21
These restrictions created severe impediments to the ability to
trade and limited the power of the national government, so much
so that a meeting of representatives from the several states was
called to create a new form of government.22
As a solution to the problems with trade that developed between
the states under the Articles of Confederation, this convention
adopted the Commerce Clause as a part of the Constitution.23 The
reason for drafting the Commerce Clause was to ensure a system
of trade that would not unduly burden the new nation.24  This
simple grant of authority has, however, given rise to a host of fed-
eral regulations in a variety of areas, as well as several Supreme
Court interpretations of the scope of authority actually granted
under the commerce power.25
Many early Supreme Court cases involving the Commerce
Clause focused not on federal authority under the Commerce
Clause, but rather discussed the limits of state authority under
the "Dormant" Commerce Clause.26 These early cases held that
Congress had the authority to regulate commerce, but interpreted
the power to regulate commerce as limited to matters that truly
involved commerce among the states.27 Some early commerce
cases invalidated federal regulations that were based on the
20. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 15, at § 3.1.
21. Id.
22. Id. It appears clear, therefore, that problems with trade between the states and
with foreign nations, and the national government's inability to regulate such trade, were
major reasons why the convention that led to the drafting of the constitution was convened.
Id. at § 4.3.
23. Id.
24. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 119.
25. Id. at 119-20.
26. Id. at 122. "Under the 'Dormant' Commerce Clause, the Court invalidates some
'protectionist' state legislation, even in the absence of congressional preemption." Id. at
234. The Constitution does not expressly limit state power to regulate commerce; the Court
has, however, understood the Commerce Clause to have the negative implication that the
Commerce Clause, by granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
states, limits state regulation of such commerce even though Congress has not acted. Id.
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194-95 (1824), stated that the Commerce Clause ex-
tends to matters involving more than one state, but left to an individual state the regula-
tion of an issue occurring entirely within its borders. Id.
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Commerce Clause as beyond the scope of federal authority.28
Other cases found regulations based on the clause to be valid. In
each of these cases, however, the subjects regulated had a direct
relation to interstate commerce.29 Where the relationship to com-
merce was only indirect, the regulation was held not to be a valid
exercise of Congressional authority."° This line between direct and
indirect ties to commerce as a basis for validating congressional
authority would change dramatically in the mid-1930's.
During the first years of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's ad-
ministration, he lobbied for and signed into law several "New
Deal" programs to combat the Great Depression."1 These regula-
tions were usually passed under Congress' commerce power, but
were many times struck down by the Supreme Court as outside
the scope of the Commerce Clause.32 In 1936, President Roosevelt
devised a plan that he believed would allow his programs to with-
stand Supreme Court scrutiny by sending proposed legislation to
Congress that would permit the President to appoint additional
Justices to the Supreme Court.33 He reasoned that these Justices
would share his views on the need for his "New Deal" legislation,
and therefore, they would vote to uphold these programs. Al-
though this proposal was soundly defeated in Congress, subse-
quent rulings by the Supreme Court indicate that it was con-
cerned about the possibility of a similar intrusion on the Court by
a future President.35
The Supreme Court reversed its previous interpretation of the
Commerce Clause within one year of President Roosevelt's efforts
28. See U.S. v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (finding unconstitutional a federal law
regulating monopolies as beyond the commerce power granted under the constitution). See
also U.S. v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1869) (invalidating a law prohibiting the making for sale of
certain oils, finding that the law was a police regulation and not within the commerce
power of Congress).
29. See Houston East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding the
validity of an Interstate Commerce Commission requirement that rail carriers charge the
same rates for interstate and intrastate transportation of goods); and Swift & Co. v. U.S.,
196 U.S. 375 (1905) (holding as constitutional a federal anti-monopoly statute against com-
panies attempting to monopolize the sale of fresh meat among the states).
30. See Schechter Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 546-47 (1936).
31. CAROL BERKIN ET AL., MAKING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
VOL. II 815 (2d ed. 1999).
32. SULLIVAN and GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 135.
33. Id.
34. BERKIN, supra note 31, at 808-15.




to alter the makeup of the Court.6  In National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Loughlin Steel,37 the Court held that a law pro-
tecting the rights of employees to organize was a valid exercise of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, despite the fact
that the employees in the case were employed completely within
the state of Pennsylvania.8 This holding was in stark contrast to
the Court's holding just one year earlier in Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States,39 where the Court stated that a statute that had
only an indirect effect on interstate commerce was not a valid ex-
ercise of the commerce power." Over the next sixty years, the
Court consistently expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause
and gave Congress a virtual blank check to enact any law under
the guise of regulating commerce." This power went so far as to
regulate areas, such as crime, that had traditionally been reserved
to the states under their police powers.4" In 1995, however, the
Supreme Court invalidated a regulation under the Commerce
Clause for the first time since 1937.43
In United States v. Lopez," the Supreme Court was faced with a
high school senior that had brought a handgun to school, in viola-
tion of federal law.45 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist examined the history of the Commerce Clause, and
then concluded that there are three areas that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause. Congress can "regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce;" 6 "the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce;" 7 and activities that "have a substantial relation to
36. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Loughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
37. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. Jones & Loughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 27-28.
39. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
40. See Schechter Poulty, 295 U.S. at 546-47.
41. See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding federal laws setting minimum
wages and maximum hours for employees that produced goods to be shipped in interstate
commerce); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a Department of
Agriculture regulation limiting the amount of wheat that a farmer could produce was a
valid regulation of commerce).
42. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (finding constitutional a
law that prohibited loan sharking).
43. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 119.
44. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
45. Id. The law which Lopez violated was titled the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and it
"[forbade] any 'individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that he knows. . . is a
school zone." Id.
46. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted).
47. Id. (citations omitted).
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interstate commerce." 8 The Court dismissed the first two catego-
ries in its analysis of the Gun-Free School Zone Act, stating that
the law in question was neither a regulation of the channels of
commerce or the instrumentalities of commerce.49 The Court also
found that the possession of firearms in a school zone did not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce." The Court was concerned
it would require too great an inference to find that gun possession
in a school zone has a substantial effect on interstate commerce
and would transform Congress' limited commerce authority to
that of a police power." The Court was also concerned that the
statute "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in ques-
tion affect[ed] interstate commerce.5 2
The holding that federal regulation of gun possession in a school
zone was unconstitutional as beyond Congress' commerce author-
ity would appear to settle the issue of whether of whether the fed-
eral government may regulate the possession of firearms. If fire-
arms possession in a school zone cannot be regulated by Congress
under the Commerce Clause, it follows that no federal regulation
of gun possession would be valid. Case law does not, however, re-
flect this logic. In the eight years since Lopez, federal courts have
had no trouble convicting defendants of violating statutes prohib-
iting firearms possession, in spite of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Lopez. 3 Additionally, even the law found unconstitutional in Lo-
pez is now valid under the Commerce Clause because Congress
amended the law to include a jurisdictional element requiring that
the possessed firearm be "in or affecting commerce." Because the
possession of firearms is still being regulated by the federal gov-
ernment under the Commerce Clause, it is necessary to analyze
48. Id. at 558-59.
49. Id. at 559.
50. Id. at 567.
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
52. Id. at 561-62.
53. See U.S. v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a statute prohibit-
ing the possession of a firearm by a felon as a valid use of the commerce power because the
statute contained a nexus to commerce); and U.S. v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir.
1995) (ruling that a statute prohibiting the possession of a machine gun was a constitu-
tional use of the commerce power).
54. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 163. See also U.S. v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037,
1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (prohibiting possession of a firearm
within 1000 feet of a school) is a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power because the




the validity of these regulations under the traditional view of the
Commerce Clause, as well as under Lopez, in order to determine if
Congress should have the authority to regulate gun possession.
B. Why the Possession of Firearms Cannot Be Regulated by the
Federal Government Under the Commerce Clause
Based on the early understanding of the Commerce Clause,
there can be little question that the mere possession of a firearm
would not be an activity that could be regulated by Congress un-
der the Commerce Clause. In Gibbons v. Ogden,55 the Supreme
Court discussed the scope of the Commerce Clause.56 The Court
stated that:
The enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to
which the power was to be extended, would not have been
made, had the intention been to extend the power to every de-
scription. The enumeration presupposes something not enu-
merated; and that something, if we regard the language or
the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a state.
The Court concluded that the scope of the Commerce Clause in-
cluded "those internal concerns which affect the [s]tates generally;
but not to those which are completely within a particular [s]tate,
which do not affect other [sitates, and with which it is not neces-
sary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general
powers of the government."58 The possession of a firearm that oc-
curs within a state could not be regulated under the Commerce
Clause because such possession occurred completely within a state
and would be excluded from the enumerated power granted to
Congress.
Later cases upholding congressional regulations under the
Commerce Clause further illustrate that the Commerce Clause
grants Congress a limited power and would not include the power
to regulate the possession of firearms. For instance, in Schechter
Poultry, the Court held that federal laws setting minimum wage
and maximum hour requirements for employees because the goods
55. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
56. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 195.
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they produced affected interstate commerce was unconstitutional
because the effect on interstate commerce was only indirect. 9 The
Court stated that:
[w]here the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate
commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within
the domain of state power. If the Commerce Clause were con-
strued to reach all enterprises and transactions which could
be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce,
the federal authority would embrace practically all the activi-
ties of the people, and the authority of the state over its do-
mestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal
government.60
This statement makes clear that the regulated activity must have
a direct effect on interstate commerce and would be invalid if the
effect were only indirect. The possession of firearms does not have
a direct effect on interstate commerce, and under this understand-
ing of the Commerce Clause, Congress should not be using this
clause to regulate gun possession.
The decision in Lopez is further evidence that Congress does not
have the authority to regulate firearms possession under the
Commerce Clause.61 Congress can regulate only three areas under
the Commerce Clause.62 Congress may regulate the channels of
interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, or things or people moving in interstate commerce; and
things that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 3 In
order for Congress to have the power to regulate firearms posses-
sion, it must fit into one of these three categories.
The channels of commerce refer to roads, waterways, and other
avenues through which things or people may be moved." Fire-
arms clearly do not fall under the channels of commerce, making
Congressional regulation of their possession impossible under this
category.
An instrumentality is defined as "[a] thing used to achieve an
end or purpose. '6 5 Things used to achieve the ends of interstate
59. Schechter Poulty, 295 U.S. at 550.
60. Id at 546.
61. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-68.
62. Id. at 558-60.
63. Id.
64. See U.S. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 72 (1931).
65. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 639 (7th ed. 2000).
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commerce would seem to be the things used to transport goods
interstate, such as railroads, trucks, and airplanes.66 Under this
definition, firearms are not instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce.
Although firearms do not fall into either the channels of com-
merce or instrumentalities of commerce theories, many would ar-
gue that these regulations of firearms are still valid uses of Con-
gress' commerce power because the possession of firearms quali-
fies under the category of having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." A major problem with this assertion is that it is diffi-
cult to demonstrate the substantial effect on interstate commerce
caused by possession of a firearm. In Lopez, the United States
argued that the cost associated with crime is substantial and that
this cost is born by all of the citizens of the country because of in-
surance. 68 The government further asserted that higher crime
would discourage travel, and decreased travel would have a sub-
stantial effect on commerce.69 Under the traditional interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, the effect of firearms possession on in-
terstate commerce would be too indirect to permit Congressional
regulation.0 The majority in Lopez seemed to agree, stating that
"[t]o uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States."71
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that even under
the most expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause, the
scope of the clause still had limits.72 In each of the cases that
regulated intrastate activity, there was a clear economic activity
being regulated.73 The possession of firearms is not an economic
activity in any sense, and the regulation has no relation to the
regulation of economic activity because it is a criminal statute.74
This distinction is important because the Commerce Clause allows
66. Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (stating that inter-
state carriers are instruments of interstate commerce).
67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67.
68. Id. at 563-64.
69. Id.
70. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 546-47.
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
72. Id. at 560-61.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 561.
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Congress to regulate commerce "among the several [s]tates .. .
Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons that commerce "describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in
all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying
on that intercourse." s Under an expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, it is possible that Congress may regulate the
sale of firearms under its commerce authority because such sales
are economic activities that could arguably have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. The mere possession of firearms,
however, does not fall within the definition of commerce discussed
in Gibbons and therefore crosses the line from a regulation of
commerce to a statute criminalizing activity that is properly
within the jurisdiction of the states under their police power.
The theory that crime has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate the possession of
firearms under the Commerce Clause, creates a more disconcert-
ing problem. Under this theory, Congress would have the power
to regulate far more than the possession of firearms. Congress
could enact criminal laws prohibiting any type of crime under the
theory that crime has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Regulation of crime is a police power exercised by the states
within their borders and reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.17  As a result, an interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that would permit Congress to regulate crime, as it does by
regulating possession of firearms within a state, would upset the
balance of power between the federal government and the states
and expand federal power far beyond the limits intended by the
Founding Fathers and set forth in the Constitution.
Beyond the intrusion upon the authority of the states to regu-
late crime created by this interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
the Court in Lopez discussed a more expansive problem this view
of the Commerce Clause would create.78 Chief Justice Rehnquist
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
76. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), stating that:
[tihe power of the [sitate to impose restraints and burdens on persons and property in
conservation and promotion of the public health, good order, and prosperity is a
power originally and always belonging to the [s]tates, not surrendered by them to the
[gleneral [g]overnment, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the United
States, and essentially exclusive, and the suppression of lotteries as a harmful busi-
ness falls within this power, commonly called of police.
Id. at 364-65 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
78. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67.
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stated that, based on the reasoning set forth by the government
for finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it would be
difficult to think of any area of human life that could not be regu-
lated by Congress under its commerce power.79 Justice Rehnquist
stated that this reasoning could be extended so far as to include
marriage and issues concerning family life."' If family issues
would be subject to Congressional regulation, it seems that there
would be no area of human life outside Congress' regulatory au-
thority under the Commerce Clause. This is a result clearly not
intended by the framers of the national government when they
designed a constitution of limited powers.
The Supreme Court in Lopez expressed concern that upholding
regulations such as the one at issue in that case would essentially
give Congress a plenary power over all areas of life, leaving the
states with little regulatory authority.8 The Court found that the
possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of a school zone did not
substantially affect interstate commerce, and therefore held that
the statute at issue in the case went beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause.82 However, subsequent rulings by lower fed-
eral courts as well as statutory developments indicate that simply
requiring that the firearm in question had moved in interstate
commerce at some point is enough to cure the constitutional defect
and bring the regulation of firearms possession within the scope of
the commerce power. Following the decision in Lopez, Congress
amended the statute at issue in Lopez to require that the firearm
possessed within 1,000 feet of a school zone must have moved in or
affected interstate commerce in order for the statute to have been
violated.83 This minor drafting change seems to have made a sig-
nificant difference in the constitutionality of the statute. In
United States v. Danks, 4 the Eighth Circuit held that the statute
was a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause because the amended statute contains a jurisdiction
requirement that the firearm in question had moved in or affected
commerce.
85
79. Id. at 564.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 564-66.
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-68.
83. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 163.
84. 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
85. Danks, 221 F.3d at 1038-39.
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In other federal cases involving the possession of firearms, fed-
eral courts have reached similar conclusions with regard to their
regulation. In United States v. Singletary," the Third Circuit
ruled that the federal statute prohibiting the possession of fire-
arms by a felon is a valid exercise of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause because the statute requires that the fire-
arm in question must have at some time in the past moved in in-
terstate commerce 8  A similar decision upholding the validity of
the same law under the Commerce Clause was reached by the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Turner.88 In United States v.
Bayles," the Tenth Circuit held that a federal statute prohibiting
the possession of firearms by a person subject to a domestic vio-
lence protective order was a valid exercise of the commerce power
because the statute requires that the firearms regulated had
moved in interstate commerce. ° These cases and numerous others
illustrate that Congress need only require that a firearm moved in
interstate commerce at some prior time in order to subject the
firearm to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Whether Congress should be able to regulate gun possession
upon a simple showing that the firearm in question has moved in
interstate commerce is the key issue for determination. Congress
may regulate commerce among the states.91 This power must be
broad enough to enter the interior of a state where interstate
commerce is transacted within the state." Despite the extension
of this power into the state, there must be a point at which the
thing regulated ceases to be a thing in interstate commerce and
becomes subject exclusively to the control of the state under its
reserved police power. For instance, in City of New York v. Miln,93
where the defendant sought to invalidate a New York law regulat-
ing people that had entered the state by arguing that the law was
invalid because it was a regulation of commerce.94 The Supreme
Court found that the New York law was a valid police regulation,
and was beyond Congress' commerce power."5 So should it be with
86. 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001).
87. Singletary, 268 F.3d at 204.
88. 77 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 1996).
89. 310 F.3d. 1302 (10th Cir. 2002)
90. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1307-08.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
92. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195-97.
93. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
94. Miln, 36 U.S. at 132.
95. Id. at 132.
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firearms; once the firearm has been received within the state, the
good should be viewed as passing out of interstate commerce and
Congress' regulatory authority, and thereafter may be regulated
only under the police power of the state in which the possession
occurred.
Hoke v. United States96 provides further support for the proposi-
tion that there must be an end point to the movement of some-
thing in commerce so that the regulation after that point is exclu-
sively within the purview of the states.97 At issue in Hoke was a
statute passed by Congress making it illegal to transport women
and girls across state lines for "immoral purposes."98 The defen-
dants contended that the act was a regulation of Hoke v. United
States prostitution, and because such regulation fell within the
police power granted to the states, Congress was without power to
regulate such conduct, even under the Commerce Clause.99 The
Court conceded that the states have the authority to control the
morals of their citizens.0 0 The Court further stated, however, that
while Congress may not prohibit an activity within a state, it may
prohibit interstate transportation.' The opinion makes clear that
Congress has the authority to regulate things moving in interstate
commerce, in this case women being transported for prostitu-
tion. °  When the thing to be regulated ends its interstate journey,
it is no longer a part of commerce and can only be regulated by the
state.' The Court held that the state is to regulate prostitution,
but Congress could regulate the transportation of women for that
purpose.' A similar rule should exist with respect to firearms.
Congress may regulate firearms while they are traveling in inter-
state commerce. When they are received in their state of destina-
tion, they should no longer be viewed as in commerce and subject
to federal regulation.
By permitting Congress to regulate gun possession by simply
requiring that the possessed firearm has moved in interstate
commerce, the concerns discussed in Lopez regarding the limits of
federal power are not sufficiently addressed. This is because al-
96. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
97. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 316-17.
98. Id. at 316-17.
99. Id. at 319-20.
100. Id. at 321.
101. Id. at 322.
102. Hoke, 227 U.S. 323.
103. See Hoke, 227 U.S. at 322.
104. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323.
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most all firearms have at some time in the past moved in inter-
state commerce, making this a condition for federal regulation a
formality at best.' °5 More importantly, requiring that a firearm
has moved in interstate commerce does not change the fact that
the possession of firearms is not an economic activity, but rather a
criminal statute. The Lopez Court stated that permitting Con-
gress to use the Commerce Clause in this way would grant to
Congress a police power, 10 6 a result that does not change by simply
requiring that the firearm had at some point moved in interstate
commerce.
The great breadth of regulatory authority Congress could enjoy
using this interpretation of the Commerce Clause would allow
Congress to regulate almost any area of society. This result would
upset the federal-state balance established by the Constitution.' 7
As a result, the Commerce Clause should no longer be given such
an expansive interpretation, and Congress should not be constitu-
tionally permitted to regulate the possession of firearms under the
Commerce Clause.
Even assuming that the regulation of firearm possession under
the Commerce Clause is a valid exercises of Congressional com-
merce authority, this analysis still requires further evaluation.
The second prong of the test for the constitutionality of any federal
regulation is whether the regulation conforms with other specific
rights found in the Constitution.'08
III. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AS A CHECK ON CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE GUN POSSESSION
The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear [airms, shall not be infringed.""0 9 The Sec-
ond Amendment appears to ensure that people will be free to pos-
sess firearms. Federal courts, however, have interpreted the Sec-
ond Amendment in a much more restrictive fashion. For instance,
in United States v. Pruess,"' Pruess argued that his conviction for
violating a federal law, which prohibited a convicted felon from
105. SULLIvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 163.
106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
107. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
108. ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 15, at § 3.1.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
110. 13 Fed. Appx. 87 (4th Cir. 2001).
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carrying a firearm that had moved in interstate commerce, should
be overturned because the law violated the Second Amendment.'
The court disagreed, stating that "because Pruess has not shown
how his conviction interferes with the collective right of the people
to maintain a well-regulated militia, we can discern no error of
constitutional magnitude in this regard.""
2
The language in Pruess seems to indicate that, if any group of
people organize and maintain a well-regulated militia, these peo-
ple collectively have a right to keep and bear arms."' However,
courts have further limited the "collective right" by holding that
the Second Amendment confers only the right of a state to raise a
militia.14  The Sixth Circuit stated, in United States v. Napier,
that since the Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the
State to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear
arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional
right of an individual to possess a firearm.""5 This language
leaves little doubt that, in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit at least, no
person or group of people has the Constitutional right to possess
firearms. The Sixth Circuit vests this right exclusively in the
states when it explains "the Second Amendment is a right held by
the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a
private citizen.""
6
An interpretation of the Second Amendment as conveying a
right to the states, as opposed to individuals, creates problems as
soon as the use of the word "people" in other amendments within
the Bill of Rights is analyzed."7 The Fourth Amendment refers to
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons" and it is "dif-
ficult to know how one might plausibly read the Fourth Amend-
ment as other than a protection of individual rights.""8 The First
Amendment refers to the right of the people to peaceably assem-
ble,"9 and "it would approach the frivolous to read the assembly
and petition clause as referring only to the right of state legisla-
111. Pruess, 13 Fed. Appx. at 88.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., U.S. v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000).
115. Napier, 233 F.3d at 402 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 403.
117. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, YALE L.J. 637, 645
(1989).
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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tures to meet and pass a remonstrance directed to Congress or the
President.""'
An examination of the wording of the Tenth Amendment also
support the conclusion that the Second Amendment applies to in-
dividuals as opposed to the states. The Tenth Amendment pro-
vides that rights not discussed in the Constitution are "reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." 2' The Second Amend-
ment uses the word "people" as opposed to the word "states" when
discussing who has the right to bear arms; viewing the Second
Amendment as conveying a right only in the states, and not in
individuals, necessitates that the word "people" as used in the
Second Amendment refer to the states. 2 This leads to a problem
of construction when considering the Tenth Amendment. If the
word "people" really means "states," the Tenth Amendment would
not declare that rights are reserved to the states or to the peo-
ple.'23 The drafters of the Constitution suggest that the words
have different meanings; otherwise, the Tenth Amendment would
not reserve to both the people and the states the rights not enu-
merated in the other amendments. Therefore, if these words have
different meanings in the Tenth Amendment, it seems odd that
one word would be used to mean the opposite in the Second
Amendment.
Further evidence that the word "people" does not refer to the
states in the Second Amendment is taken from the decision in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.'24 This case involved the issue
of whether the Fourth Amendment protected citizens of Mexico
while in Mexico.2 In holding that it did not, the Supreme Court
engaged in an analysis of what the phrase "the people" meant
when used in the constitution. The Court stated that:
The people seems to have been a term of art employed in se-
lect parts of the Constitution. The preamble declares that the
Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the
United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of
120. Levinson, supra note 117 at 645.
121. U.S. CONST. amend X.
122. Levinson, supra note 117, at 645.
123. Christopher Chrisman, Constitutional Structure and the Second Amendment: A
Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 449 (2001).
124. David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Su-
preme Court has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 176
(1999).
125. Id. at 176.
Summer 2004
Duquesne Law Review
the people to keep and bear arms," and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendment provide that certain rights and powers are re-
tained by and reserved to "the people". . . . While this textual
exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggest that "the Peo-
ple" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First
and Second Amendment, and to whom rights are reserved in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connections with this country to be con-
sidered part of that community.
2 6
Logically speaking, "if 'the people' whose right to arms is protected
by the Second Amendment are the American people, then 'the
right of the people' in the Second Amendment does not mean 'the
right of the states.'' 127 As a result, an interpretation of the Second
Amendment as conveying a right only to the states is erroneous
and not based on the text of the Constitution or proper Constitu-
tional interpretation.
In addition to the text of the Constitution, the ideals on which
our country was founded clearly demonstrate that the Second
Amendment must convey an individual right. The Tenth Amend-
ment's use of the phrase "the people" demonstrates that "the peo-
ple" are a distinct political entity, separate from either state or
national government.12 ' This proposition is further supported by
the fact that, during the ratification of the Constitution, Alexan-
der Hamilton stated:
[T]he necessity of laying the foundation of our national gov-
ernment deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated au-
thority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the
solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of na-
tional power ought to flow immediately from that pure, origi-
nal fountain of all legitimate authority.
129
James Madison echoed these sentiments when he stated, "[t]he
federal and [s]tate governments are in fact but different agents
and trustees of the people."3 ° These statements by two of the most
revered founders of the United States, as to the meaning of "the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Chrisman, supra note 123, at 454.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 455.
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people" provide strong evidence that an interpretation of "the peo-
ple" in the Second Amendment to mean "the states" is a perver-
sion of Constitutional interpretation. As such, the Second
Amendment should be read to convey to the individual citizens of
the United States the right to possess firearms.
Although the Second Amendment should be viewed as convey-
ing to individuals the right to possess firearms, this right, as with
all other rights protected by the Constitution, is not absolute.'
While the right to possess a firearm may be restricted, any restric-
tion must be based on a compelling governmental interest, and the
regulation must be the least restrictive alternative to check the
activity to be prevented. 132 In support of restricting the possession
of firearms, it could be argued that firearms increase crime, that
the government has a compelling interest in regulating crime, and
that restricting firearms possession is the least restrictive alterna-
tive in regulating such crime. Crime prevention is clearly a com-
pelling interest. Restrictions on the possession of firearms are
not, however, the least restrictive alternative. States are empow-
ered with the authority to make criminal almost any activity be-
lieved to be contrary to the public good or civil order, such as theft
or murder. This is a far less restrictive step than taking a right
from the entire populace because laws can be passed prohibiting
theft, murder, and other evils sought to be prevented by a state
without pre-emptively depriving certain groups of people of a Con-
stitutionally protected right. More importantly, it is not for the
federal government to ensure the safety of the people by restrict-
ing the possession of firearms, regardless of whether this is the
least restrictive alternative to prevent crime. The power to define
what is criminal is a power reserved to the states. 3 The federal
government should no longer restrict the possession of firearms
because such restrictions are not the least restrictive alternative
to achieve the governmental interest, and therefore, Congress
should leave to the states the responsibility of deciding what is
criminal.
131. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 385 (2003).
132. Id. at § 387.
133. REDLICH, supra note 35, at 52. The federal government may define crimes within




When the Commerce Clause is properly evaluated, it becomes
clear that the possession of firearms within a state is not a proper
use of this power. The clause was included in the Constitution to
facilitate trade and, for 150 years thereafter, was limited to this
purpose. It was only following President Roosevelt's attempt to
alter the Court that the scope of the Commerce Clause was ex-
panded beyond its original boundaries to a point where nearly any
activity could be regulated under the guise of regulating com-
merce. Although Lopez made a partial return to a more tradi-
tional and reasonable understanding of the commerce power, the
holding in that case still permits federal regulation into almost all
areas of life by simply requiring that the thing to be regulated
moved in interstate commerce at some point in time. This result
gives to the federal government far more authority than is granted
by the Constitution.
Also, the federal government should not be regulating the pos-
session of firearms because the Second Amendment should be
viewed as granting to individuals the right to possess firearms.
Interpreting the Second Amendment as conveying a right to the
states creates inconsistencies with other Constitutional Amend-
ments in the Bill of Rights. Although the Second Amendment
should be viewed as conveying an individual right, this right is
subject to restriction. It is not, however, within the jurisdiction of
the federal government to restrict the possession of firearms.
That responsibility is left to the states under their police power.
Federal courts have not adopted the above analysis, ruling in-
stead that the Commerce Clause permits the regulation of the
possession of firearms, and that the Second Amendment does not
convey an individual right to possess firearms. In a society such
as ours that faces threats of violence from domestic criminals and
foreign terrorists, it is both socially and politically popular to re-
strict access to firearms. But social or political expedience is no
reason to ignore the clear meaning of the Constitution. The politi-
cal branches of the federal government will sometimes attempt to
enact legislation without properly analyzing the constitutionality
of the proposed laws. It is the responsibility of federal courts to
make reasoned decisions regarding whether a federal act is consti-
tutional to ensure that the rights of the people are protected. Fu-
ture courts addressing the issue of whether Congress may regu-
late firearms possession because the firearm in question had
moved in interstate commerce should hold that when the firearm
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is received within a state, that firearm is no longer in interstate
commerce and thereafter should not be subject to federal regula-
tion under the Commerce Clause, but rather, the firearm at issue
should be subject only to the police power of the state. These
courts should further hold that the Second Amendment provides
individuals with the right to possess firearms, and that the gov-
ernment may not intrude upon this right absent a showing that
such intrusion meets a compelling governmental interest and is
the least restrictive alternative. The regulation of crime is a
power reserved to the states, and the federal government, there-
fore, has no compelling interest in regulating firearms possession.
Because the states may regulate the violent crime sought to be
prevented, courts should hold that regulating firearms possession
is not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the compelling
interest of preventing crime.
Samuel J. Toney IV
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